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COMMENTS
THE DIVERSITY PRINCIPLE AND THE MFJ
INFORMATION SERVICES RESTRICTION:
APPLYING TIME-WORN FIRST AMENDMENT
ASSUMPTIONS TO NEW TECHNOLOGIES
The first amendment protects the right of every person to participate in
the marketplace of ideas. It does not protect government imposed "diver-
sity" in that market.' The evolution of the "diversity principle,"2 which
mandates a robust information marketplace for the free exchange of ideas,
reached its zenith in United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co. (A T& T). 3 In AT&T, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia entered a consent decree, pursuant to the federal antitrust laws,
excluding American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) and the divested Bell
Operating Companies (BOC's) from, among other things, entering the elec-
tronic publishing industry.4 The court's rationale for excluding the BOC's
1. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[Ilf there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment
than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us
but freedom for the thought that we hate."); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes acknowledged that:
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on
unless some other belief outweighs it .... If in the long run the beliefs expressed in
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way.
Id. at 673.
2. The United States Supreme Court defined the "diversity principle" as "the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources .... Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
3. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983) This case is commonly known as the Modification of Final Judgement or MFJ and
A T& T, see Worthington, The Case for Continued Judicial Enforcement of the A T& T Decree, 9
COMM. ENT. L.J. 75 n. 1 (1986). However, the A T& T decision actually modified and approved
the MFJ which is appended to the opinion at 552 F. Supp. at 226.
4. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia defined "electronic pub-
lishing" as "any information which a provider or publisher has, or has caused to be originated,
authored, compiled, collected, or edited, or in which he has a direct or indirect financial or
proprietary interest, and which is disseminated to an unaffiliated person through some elec-
tronic means." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 181. Electronic publishing includes two-way "interac-
tive transaction services . . . [and] news, business and financial reports, editorials, columns,
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from electronic publishing rested on the presumption that their presence in
the information marketplace would endanger the underlying first amend-
ment value of information diversity.5 Thus, the court used the diversity prin-
ciple to restrict the BOC's right to speak, thereby signaling a departure from
the first amendment goal of making the most information available to the
greatest number of people and an adoption of what might be considered a
"competitive" or marketplace approach to the diversity principle whereby
government may restrict the speech of selected persons or companies in or-
der to promote competition in the information market.
In its unprecedented reading of the first amendment, the district court
speculated that permitting the BOC's to become electronic publishers would
deter other potential publishers from entering the market.6 Furthermore, the
BOC's thereby would gain monopoly control over news and information in
the United States.7 However, an analysis of first amendment case law reveals
that banning one speaker from the market to enhance another falls outside
the permissible realm of government or private control, and frustrates the
goal of information dissemination contemplated by the diversity principle.8
The court's application of the diversity principle to the electronic pub-
lishing industry not only violates the principles inherent in the first amend-
ment, but actually prevents new information services from entering the
market altogether.' During the first triennial review of the consent
sports, features, and electronic advertising." Id. at 181 nn.207-08. For a definition of "infor-
mation services," see infra note 188.
5. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 184-85. By cross reference, the court imputed its rationale for
banning AT&T's entry into electronic publishing to the Bell Operating Companies (BOC's).
Id. at 190 n.239; United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 (D.D.C.), appeal
docketed, No. 87-5388 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1987). The district court
reasoned that because the BOC's controlled the transmission network that electronic publish-
ers needed in order to deliver their service, the BOC's would act anticompetitively by exclud-
ing competing publishers from the market, AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 189-90, and thereby
frustrate the first amendment goal of diversity. Id. at 184; Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586.
6. AT&T 552 F. Supp. at 182.
7. Id. at 184-85; see also Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586-87.
8. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("[T]he concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed 'to secure the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources' .... (quoting
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1,,20 (1945)).
9. See Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line of Busi-
ness Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification of Final Judg-
ment at 104, 113-15; Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 525 (No. 82-0192) (noting that
competition had flourished since divestiture, the Department of Justice advocated elimination




decree,1" the same district court dismissed any contention that information
restrictions infringed the BOC's first amendment rights."
This Comment surveys the historical development of the diversity princi-
ple in the context of content-based regulations imposed on electronic com-
munications. It examines the diversity principle as applied by the district
court in the 1982 AT&T consent decree. Next, it analyzes the court's char-
acterization of the asserted governmental interest in regulating the informa-
tion services industry and demonstrates that the court's application of the
diversity principle actually extends governmental powers to regulate con-
tent. It then focuses on the court's rationale for applying restrictions in light
of the first amendment proscription against government interference in
speech and discusses limitations on application of the diversity principle
outside the broadcast context. This Comment discusses the problems inher-
ent in government restrictions imposed to promote information diversity in
the new technologies fostered by the break-up of AT&T and the restructured
telecommunications industry. It argues that the diversity principle consti-
tutes a misapplication of the first amendment goals in light of the changing
nature of the electronic communications industry. Finally, this Comment
concludes that fostering diversity through government restrictions on speech
violates the first amendment value it purports to promote.
I. THE BIRTH OF THE DIVERSITY PRINCIPLE: REGULATING IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
Justice Holmes forewarned that the "ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas [and] that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"1 2 rather
than by government decree. 3 Gaining acceptance in the marketplace of
ideas presupposes the diversity principle: that "debate on public issues
10. The district court modified the proposed consent decree to provide for review of the
final order on a triennial basis. The court opened the triennial review proceeding to all inter-
ested parties including third party intervenors. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 225.
11. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586 n.273.
12. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148-
61 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas could find no role for the government to play in
enforcing any set of ideas on the press.
[T]he prospect of putting Government in a position of control over publishers is to
me an appalling one .... The struggle for liberty has been a struggle against Govern-
ment .... [I]t is anathema to the First Amendment to allow Government any role of
censorship over newspapers, magazines, books, art, music, TV, radio, or any other
aspect of the press.
Id. at 162.
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should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."14
From Justice Holmes' concept of a "free trade in ideas" competing in an
open marketplace comes a sharp division between those who argue that the
"public interest" requires affirmative government involvement in regulating
the media' 5 and those adhering to the first amendment's clear language that,
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ....",
The latter view, in its simplistic form, holds that "truth" needs no help from
Congress. In fact, when government involves itself in ordering speech, truth
invariably suffers.
17
These two diametrically opposing theories for achieving diversity of view-
points conflict each time technology opens another avenue of communica-
tion. Courts have given steady recognition to the idea that each new media
carries with it unique characteristics justifying variations in the first amend-
ment standards applied to them. 8 How courts respond to these justifications
14. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail ...."). See
generally Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media" - New Directions in Regulat-
ing Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201 (1979) (discussing the paradoxical challenge
facing regulators and the courts in adhering to the first amendment value of diversity and the
need to construct laws that promote new technology's potential).
15. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641,
1666-78 (1967); Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A
Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1973); see also Bollinger, Freedom of
the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976). Bollinger fails to distinguish between the various forms of media
outlets (e.g. newspapers, television, radio) arguing that by their very similarity government
regulation is justified in the broadcast media, when counterbalanced by an unrestrained print
media. Id. at 26-36. Bollinger considers this the "best of two worlds." Id. at 27, 36. Bollin-
ger's theory rests on the premise that Congress should maintain a partial regulatory structure
for the sake of fostering two distinct first amendment values, "access in a highly concentrated
press and minimal government intervention." Id. at 36.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The absolutist view accepts the first amendment at face value.
"[N]o Law," writes Justice Black, means "no law." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157
(1959) (Black, J., concurring). Justice Douglas finds no ambiguity in the clear language ex-
pressed in the first amendment: "[O]ne hard and fast principle which [the first amendment]
announces is that Government shall keep its hands off the press." CBS, 412 U.S. at 160-61
(Douglas, J., concurring).
17. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
In a per curiam decision with each justice writing a separate concurring opinion, the Supreme
Court explained the role of a free press acting as a check on government power.
The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would
remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it
could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unre-
strained press can effectively expose deception in government.
Id.
18. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("It has become
something of a truism to observe that 'differences in the characteristics of news [sic] media
[Vol. 38:471
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turns largely on how they view the nature of the medium. 19 In a medium
such as broadcasting where the available channels of communication appear
limited by the physical characteristics of the electromagnetic spectrum itself,
advocates for government regulating in the public interest argue that literal
conformance with the constitutional injunction barring Congress from mak-
ing any law abridging speech is impractical and actually conflicts with the
underlying value of diversity.2°
A. Regulating in the Public Interest
As early as 1924, then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover ob-
served that broadcasting remained unique among American industries
in that it unanimously sought government regulation. 2' Of the four
regulatory schemes available for broadcasting - government monopoly,
common carrier, regulated private commercial enterprise and the
print/publisher model-only the unregulated print/publisher model re-
ceived no consideration. 22 The industry and Congress generally recog-
nized that the unregulated print/publisher model could not work for broad-
-casting in light of the chaotic interference prevalent on the airwaves in
the early years prior to 1927.23 However, the monopoly24 and common
justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.' "(quoting Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 386)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
19. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each medium
of expression ... must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it
.... "); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386 ("differences in the characteristics of new media justify
differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them").
20. See sources cited supra note 15.
21. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING ACT OF
1987, H.R. REP. No. 108, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1987) [hereinafter FAIRNESS IN BROAD-
CASTING]; see E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 10
(1973). At the Fourth National Radio Conference in 1925 the broadcast industry agreed on
the necessity of government regulation. I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 116-17 (1983).
However, the industry would confine government to issuing licenses, setting power limits and
assigning wavelengths. Id. Further, it would seek to limit government involvement to only
those aspects of broadcasting creating interference and would prohibit any form of censorship.
Id. The industry recommended that broadcasters should remain vested with first amendment
rights of free speech and stay free of common carrier responsibilities imposed on public utili-
ties. Id. at 117. The industry rejected AT&T's common carrier plan for radio communication
and agreed to operate for the benefit of the public, "or as necessary in the public interest." Id.
For a discussion of AT&T's plan for broadcasting, see infra note 25.
22. I. POOL, supra note 21, at 108-09.
23. See generally supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. 1 E. BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE
UNITED STATES 52 (1966). Because of the maritime environment in which radio operated,
shortly after World War I Congress introduced a bill (H.R. 13159) to create a government
monopoly in radio with regulatory control resting in the U.S. Navy. Id. During hearings on
the bill held December 12-19, 1918, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniel testified that:
1989]
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carrier 25 models were considered and subsequently rejected in favor of a reg-
ulated private commercial enterprise.26
Broadcast regulation evolved from the very limited authority granted in
the Radio Act of 191227 through the Radio Act of 192728 to the Communi-
cations Act of 193429 and subsequent amendments. 30 The 1912 Act required
any person intending to use the radio frequencies to obtain a broadcast li-
cense. 3 1 In addition, it authorized the Secretary of Commerce to enforce the
The passage of this bill will secure for all time to the Navy Department the control of
radio in the United States, and will enable the Navy to continue the splendid work it
has carried on during the war .... [I]t is my profound conviction and is the convic-
tion of every person I have talked with in this country and abroad who had studied
this question that it [radio] must be a monopoly. It is up to the Congress to say
whether it is a monopoly for the government or a monopoly for a company.
Id. at 53.
After careful consideration, with passionate and heated pleas from the commercial sector,
the Bill was defeated. Id. at 53-56 (footnotes omitted).
25. I. POOL, supra note 21, at 136-37. In the early 1900's, AT&T's vision for the new
radio technologies resembled its existing monopoly in the telephone business. Id. at 136.
Under the regulatory scheme of common carrier, AT&T would build and operate studios and
radio transmitters in every city and customers who wished to purchase air time could come
into an AT&T studio and broadcast. Id. AT&T called its service "toll broadcasting." Id.
AT&T asserted no desire to provide its own programming, but would remain a carrier for
others. Id. at 34-35. In 1921, AT&T established station WEAF in New York to test its broad-
cast plan. If WEAF succeeded, it planned to build additional stations in every city and to use
the existing AT&T phone lines to network these same stations. Id. A struggle for control of
the fledgling radio business ensued between AT&T and Radio Corporation of America (RCA)
which ended in 1926 with a settlement agreement. Id. AT&T agreed to abandon the broad-
casting business for RCA's commitment to use AT&T owned transmission lines to network its
broadcast stations. Further, the agreement called for both parties to exchange patent licenses.
Id. AT&T sold WEAF to RCA which later became WNBC, the flagship station for the Na-
tional Broadcasting Company (NBC). Networking became the essential ingredient of a long
and complementary relationship between broadcasters and AT&T that lasted from 1926 until
the advent of satellites and fiber optic communications. Id.; see also W.P. BANNING, COM-
MERCIAL BROADCAST PIONEER: THE WEAF EXPERIMENT, 1922-1926 (1946); 1 E.
BARNOUW, supra note 24, at 105-14.
26. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
27. Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat.
1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
28. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
29. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982
& Supp. III 1985) [hereinafter Communications Act].
30. See generally NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) ("[T]he basic provisions
of [the Radio] Act are incorporated in the Communications Act ...."); FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) ("In its essentials the Communications Act of 1934
derives from the Federal Radio Act of 1927 .... "); E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note
21, at 9.
31. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, § 1, 37 Stat. 302, 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch.
169. 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
[Vol. 38:471
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Radio Act of 1912 "for the purpose of preventing or minimizing interfer-
ence"32 in the spectrum and granted absolute priority to maritime communi-
cations by ordering all parties off the air on hearing a distress signal.
33
In 1923, when Secretary Hoover attempted to reduce the mounting radio
interference, resulting from station crowding, 34 by denying some applica-
tions for broadcast licenses and thereby, limiting the number of stations us-
ing the airwaves, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit seriously undermined his authority. In Hoover v. Intercity
Radio Co., 35 the court held that the Secretary lacked authority to deny any
license request for a radio frequency. 36 The Secretary then attempted to ac-
commodate the increasing number of stations by limiting each station's
power and the number of hours it could remain on the air.37 However, in
32. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1923), appeal dismissed
per stipulation, 266 U.S. 636 (1924).
33. Id. Congress passed the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1910, ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629, re-
pealed by Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44
Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, which required
ocean going vessels leaving any American port to possess a radio capable of transmitting and
receiving messages. Id. § 1, 36 Stat. 629-30. The Radio Act of 1912 regulated ship-to-ship
communications and made interference with distress communications unlawful. " ' [ C]alls of
distress from vessels imperiled on the sea go unheeded or are drowned out in the etheric bed-
lam produced by numerous stations all trying to compete at once.... It is not putting the case
to [sic] strongly to state that the situation is intolerable, and is continually growing worse.' "
FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING, supra note 21, at 6 (quoting S. REP. No. 659, 61st Cong. 2d
Sess. 4 (1910)).
34. When two or more persons attempt to transmit on the same radio frequency at the
same time, interference will result. Usually the station transmitting with the most power will
drown out the lesser powered station. However, neither station is heard satisfactorily. Techni-
cally structuring the radio spectrum by allocating frequencies among the various broadcasters
was the principal justification for broadcast regulation. See Hoover, 286 F. at 1007; see also
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and
the result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies consti-
tuted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the
Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little use be-
cause of the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and
predictably heard. Consequently, the Federal Radio Commission was established to
allocate frequencies among competing applicants in a manner responsive to the pub-
lic "convenience, interest, or necessity."
Id. at 375-77 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Radio Act of 1927, § 4, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162,
repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064).
35. 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 266 U.S. 636 (1924).
36. Id. at 1007 ("[T]he duty of naming a wave length is mandatory upon the Secretary.
The only discretionary act is in selecting a wave length ... which, in his judgment, will result
in the least possible interference .... The duty is mandatory; hence the courts will not hesitate
to require its performance."); see also E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 21, at 10.
37. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
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United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.,"8 an Illinois district court held that a
station did not violate the Radio Act of 1912 if it broadcast on frequencies
assigned by the Secretary to others; nor did a station violate the Act for not
adhering to the hour and power limitations.39 The court further found that
the Department of Commerce's role as licensing bureau did not include au-
thority to penalize stations.' By the close of 1926, the Secretary effectively
lost all control of the broadcast industry and made an unsuccessful appeal to
stations to voluntarily self-regulate.41
Prompted by the failure of broadcasters to self-regulate4 2 and industry
demand for some form of government regulation, Congress enacted the Ra-
dio Act of 19274" subsequently incorporated into Title III of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934.4" The Radio Act of 1927 divided regulatory authority
between the newly created Federal Radio Commission (FRC) and the Secre-
tary of Commerce.45 Not until the Communications Act of 1934 (Communi-
cations Act) did Congress delegate authority over communications to a
single entity.46 The Communications Act created the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (Commission or FCC) as an independent regulatory
agency.47 The statute granted the FRC and its successor, the FCC, authority
to grant broadcast licenses if either determined that the station would serve
38. 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926); see also E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 21, at
11.
39. 12 F.2d at 617-18; see NBC, 319 U.S. at 212; see also I. POOL, supra note 21, at 114.
40. Zenith, 12 F.2d at 618.
41. In 1925, there were 600 stations in operation with an additional 175 applications re-
questing licenses to start new stations. NBC, 319 U.S. at 211. In 1924, a total of 96 channels
existed. Id. By the time Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927, an additional 200 stations
had begun transmitting. Id. at 212.
42. See id. at 213; E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 21, at 11.
43. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
44. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982
& Supp. III 1985)).
45. See E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 21, at 11-16.
46. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Section 151 charges the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (Commission or FCC) to "make available ... a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-
wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for
the purpose of the national defense, [and] for the purpose of promoting safety of life and
property .... " Id.
47. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154-58 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In 1933, President Roosevelt re-
quested then-Secretary of Commerce, Daniel C. Roper, to study electronic communications
regulation. The Roper Committee recommended that Congress establish a single agency to
regulate all interstate and foreign communications by wire and radio, including telegraph, tele-
phone, and broadcast. The Roper Committee Report provided a basis for Congress to enact
the Communications Act of 1934. E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 21, at 14. Prior
to the Communications Act of 1934, authority for wireline communication resided with the
Postmaster General. See S. REP. No. 781, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1934).
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the "public interest, convenience, or necessity."4 8 Courts subsequently held
that serving the public interest49 justified affirmative government involve-
ment in regulating speech to promote information diversity in the electro-
magnetic spectrum. 50
The Communications Act forbade the newly created Commission from
interfering with a broadcaster's right of free speech by censorship.5 1 How-
ever, shortly after the Commission set out to bring order to the chaotic inter-
48. 47 U.S.C § 307(a) (1982). The Radio Act of 1927 required the Commission to deter-
mine prior to issuing a broadcast license that the public interest, convenience, or necessity be
served. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §§ 4, 9, 11, 21, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064; see NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1943).
Title III of the Communications Act of 1934 incorporated the statutory provision laid out in
the Radio Act of 1927, including the "public interest" standard for licensing. E. KRASNOW &
L. LONGLEY, supra note 21, at 15; see 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982). "[T]he Commission shall
determine ... whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the
granting of ... [a station's license]." Id.
49. Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench of England in the late
seventeenth century first expressed the idea that within the government rests certain powers to
regulate in the "public interest." McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public
Interest, 43 HARv. L. REV. 759 (1930). Lord Hale developed his theory of regulation around
the rights and powers of the King to regulate those things used in common by all persons. Id.
at 761. Those things, "'affected with a publick [sic] interest' ", according to Lord Hale, cease
to be juris privati (things of personal and real property). Id. at 759-61 (quoting Munn v. Illi-
nois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1876) (referencing Hale, De Portibus Maris, HARG. LAW TRACTS 78
(1787)). Approximately 200 years after Lord Hale set out the principle of public interest, the
Supreme Court in 1876 upheld the power of states to regulate in the "public interest." See
Munn, 94 U.S. at 125-26. An Illinois state regulation setting interstate grain elevator prices
was challenged as violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 119. The Court upheld the
regulation, quoting Lord Hale:
This brings us to inquire as to the principles upon which this power of regulation
rests .... Looking, then, to the common law, from whence came the right which the
Constitution protects, we find that when private property is "affected with a public
interest, it ceases to be juris privati only." This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale
more than two hundred years ago, in his treatise De Portibus Maris, 1 HARG. LAW
TRACTS 78, and has been accepted without objection as an essential element in the
law of property ever since.
Id. at 125-26.
50. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The Court held that the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 imposed an affirmative obligation on the Commission to determine the
"composition of [the] traffic" in addition to acting as a "traffic officer" of the airwaves. Id. at
215-16.
In one of the first cases to arise under the "public interest" standard the Federal Radio
Commission (FRC) observed that "the public interest requires ample play for the free and fair
competition of opposing views.... ." Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32,
33 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
Initially, licensees were prohibited from expressing their own views on controversial issues.
Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339-40 (1940). However, the FCC dropped this
limitation in its Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1258 (1949) [hereinaf-
ter Fairness Report].
51. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982).
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ference then existing on the airwaves it began denying licenses based on
program content.52 The entire regulatory structure rested on the Commis-
sion's authority to grant or deny a broadcast license.53 Because interference
resulted when more persons wanted to broadcast than existing technology
permitted, the Communications Act required the Commission to select
among competing applicants for the limited number of available channels.5 4
The selection process necessarily required the Commission to deny a license
to some persons currently broadcasting and force them off the air." In 1928,
the Commission decided that when choosing between two or more equally
qualified applicants for a broadcast license it would give preference to the
station with the longest service record.5 6 However, if the Commission found
a "substantial disparity" in competing stations' service, it would grant a li-
cense to the applicant with the "superior service." 57 Defining what consti-
tuted superior service required the Commission to evaluate program content
to determine if it served the public interest.5" Thus, the Commission moved
into the arena of content regulation notwithstanding the first amendment.59
B. 1940-1949: Laying the Foundation for Content Regulation
Three important events which occurred in the 1940's continue to shape
much of modem communication regulation. In 1943, the United States
Supreme Court, in National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) v. United States, 60
broadly construed the term public interest and determined that because the
spectrum represented a limited resource, the rights of listeners outweighed
52. See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. at 32.
53. NBC, 319 U.S. at 225, 226-27.
54. See id. at 226-27; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-78
(1969).
55. See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. at 35.
56. Id. at 32.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 32-35.
59. See KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). KFKB unsuc-
cessfully challenged the FRC's authority to deny a license renewal because its owner allegedly
used the station to further personal interests. Id. at 671. The owner, Dr. Brinkley, broad-
casted a daily program where he accepted anonymous calls concerning health issues and gener-
ally prescribed one of his own medicines. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia rejected KFKB's argument that the FRC engaged in censorship prohib-
ited by the Radio Act of 1927. Id. at 672. The court reasoned that because the FRC passed no
judgment on the licensee's programming prior to its release it did not engage in censorship. Id.
Rather, the court determined that the FRC may properly judge past conduct in determining
whether a licensee served the public interest. Id.; see also Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC,
62 F.2d 850, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). See generally Mayflower
Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 338-40 (1940) (broadcasters were prohibited from editorial-
izing-the rule was relaxed in the Fairness Report, supra note 50).
60. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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those of broadcasters. 6 ' Two years later, the Court, in Associated Press v.
United States,62 found that the first amendment created no exemption for the
media from the federal antitrust laws.6 3 In its decision, the Court further
acknowledged the diversity principle as the goal of the first amendment. 
6
Finally, in 1949, the FCC issued a policy statement 65 placing an affirmative
duty on broadcast licensees to actively seek out and air contrasting view-
points on controversial issues.6 6 Each of these decisions helped to firmly en-
sconce the government in regulating speech transmitted through electronic
communications.
1. NBC v. United States:" The Scarcity Rationale and the Concept of
Public Trustee
In NBC,67 authority to regulate broadcasting in the public interest re-
ceived its first major challenge. 68 Attempting to curb the trend in the broad-
cast industry toward national network control over local media
programming, the Commission initiated regulations pertaining to chain
broadcasting. 69 The chain broadcasting rules were designed to discourage
station licensees from permitting the radio networks to control local pro-
gramming through exclusive affiliate agreements, control over rates and air
time, and in some instances network ownership of stations.70 NBC chal-
lenged the new rules arguing that the "public interest" language in the Com-
61. Id. at 226-27.
62. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
63. The Supreme Court explained the relationship between the first amendment and the
antitrust laws:
[T]he argument is made that to apply the Sherman Act to this association of publish-
ers constitutes an abridgment of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First
Amendment .... The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against
application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary ...
Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas
does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints
upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.
Id. at 19-20.
64. Id. at 20.
65. Fairness Report, supra note 50.
66. Id. at 1257-58.
67. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
68. Id. at 225.
69. Id. at 193-96. Section 303(i) of the Communications Act gives the Commission au-
thority to regulate chain broadcasting. 47 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982). The Communications Act
defines chain broadcasting as simultaneous broadcasting of the same programming by con-
nected stations. Id. § 153(p) (1982). Congress inserted the chain broadcasting rules in re-
sponse to the growing power of the radio networks in the late 1920's. See 1 E. BARNOUW,
supra note 24, at 199.
70. NBC, 319 U.S. at 198-209.
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munications Act limited the Commission's authority over station licensees to
technical and engineering matters.7' The Supreme Court rejected NBC's
limited reading of the Commission's authority and held that the public inter-
est standard in the Communications Act required more of the Commission
than merely acting as the "traffic officer" of the airwaves to prevent a recur-
rence of the chaotic conditions of the 1920's.72 The Court found that the
Communications Act placed an affirmative duty on the Commission to pro-
tect the public interest beyond simply regulating the technical and engineer-
ing aspects of broadcasting. 7" NBC thus required the Commission to read
the public interest standard broadly when promulgating rules.
The Court also rejected NBC's claim that the chain broadcasting regula-
tions offended broadcasters' first amendment right of free speech.74 The
Court focused attention on the rights of the listening public and determined
that they superseded those of the broadcaster. 7  The consequences of shifting
the first amendment focus away from broadcasters' free speech rights and
focusing on the rights of those receiving information marked a rejection of
the newspaper model76 of a completely unfettered right to publish and an
adoption of a limited first amendment right for broadcast publishers subject
to government regulation. 77 The Court observed that the broadcast spec-
trum constituted a limited or scarce resource and unlike other media, the
spectrum cannot accommodate all those wishing to use it.78 Therefore, be-
cause of this limited resource, those persons entrusted with a license owed a
duty to their listeners.79
2. Associated Press v. United States: The Diversity Principle
In Associated Press, 80 the Supreme Court struck down a private agreement
between the Associated Press (AP) newswire service and its newspaper
members. 8' The agreement permitted the AP to monopolize news in the lo-
cal market by restricting membership and securing exclusive agreements re-
71. Id. at 209, 215-16.
72. Id. at 215.
73. Id. at 215-16. The Court interpreted § 303(g) of the Communications Act, which
requires the Commission to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest," as a prerequisite for the Commission to regulate to eliminate "wasteful use" of the
radio spectrum. Id. at 216.
74. Id. at 226.
75. Id. at 226-27.
76. See Bazelon, supra note 14, at 202-04; see also infra text accompanying notes 118-22.
77. NBC, 319 U.S. at 226.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 226-27.
80. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
81. Id. at 4-5, 19.
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quiring AP members to sell all news they gathered to the AP Association. 2
The government brought suit under the antitrust laws as an unlawful re-
straint of trade.8 3 The Court found AP's restrictive bylaws a contractual
restraint of trade to prevent competition, 4 and banned it from further dis-
crimination against its members' competitors.8 5
In reaching its conclusion, the Court observed that the first amendment
bars not only government but private persons from restricting the free flow
of ideas.86 Furthermore, the Court described the first amendment's underly-
ing goal as achieving "the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources."8 7 The Court thus set the "diversity princi-
ple" as a legitimate objective of the first amendment and held that it would
not tolerate any private or public restriction that discouraged diversity. 8
3. Report on Editorializing by Broadcasters: The Fairness Doctrine
In 1949, the Commission issued Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees
8 9
which described the "fairness" obligations of broadcasters, acting as trustees
for the larger listening public. 9° The Fairness Doctrine, as popularly denom-
inated, required broadcasters to seek out and air controversial issues of pub-
lic interest in their communities and achieve diversity by airing opposing
viewpoints.9 ' The expansive reading given the public interest in NBC pro-
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 19.
85. Id. at 21.
86. Id. at 20.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Fairness Report, supra note 50. Prior to the Fairness Report, the Commission's rules
precluded a broadcaster from expressing his own views or opinions over the air. See supra note
59 and accompanying text.
90. Fairness Report, supra note 50, at 1257-58; see Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (describing the Fairness Doc-
trine as the "sine qua non of every licensee"). In United Church of Christ, the court ordered
the Commission to conduct hearings on station WLBT's renewal application after the United
Church of Christ, as a representative of the listening public, filed a Fairness Doctrine com-
plaint. Id. The court compared broadcasters to newspaper publishers, but observed that be-
cause broadcasters are also public trustees, certain obligations to serve the public attached to
their licenses. Id. See generally Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The D.C. Circuit observed:
By whatever name or classification, broadcasters are temporary permittees-fiducia-
ries-of a great public resource and they must meet the highest standards which are
embraced in the public interest concept. The Fairness Doctrine plays a very large
role in assuring that the public resource granted to licensees at no cost will be used in
the public interest.
Id. at 548.
91. Fairness Report, supra note 50, at 1257-58. The Commission noted "the development
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vided the conceptual foundation for the Fairness Doctrine.92
Taken together NBC, Associated Press, and Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees had a profound effect on the government's ability to regulate
speech in the electronic media. The Court in NBC determined that because
of the unique characteristics of the radio spectrum, broadcasters' did not
enjoy absolute free speech rights protected by the first amendment. 93 Thus,
when the medium appears scarce or limited, the first amendment does not
bar government regulation impinging on free speech rights so long as the net
result, as observed in Associated Press, promotes making the most informa-
tion available to the greatest number of people.94 The Fairness Doctrine
demonstrates the Commission's early attempts to implement policy founded
on the expansive reading of its authority in NBC and adherence to the Asso-
ciated Press standard of information diversity. 5 From this foundation, the
Supreme Court went on to build a first amendment jurisprudence applicable
solely to the electronic media.
of an informed public opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas.., of the
day" as "one of the most vital questions of mass communication in a democracy," and re-
quired "licensees to devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time to the presentation
of news and programs devoted to the consideration and discussion of public issues of interest
in the community served by the particular station." Id. at 1249.
92. The Commission began questioning the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine
when it issued a Notice of Inquiry on May 14, 1984 to examine the question of whether the
Fairness Doctrine continued to promote the first amendment goal of viewpoint diversity. In-
quiry into the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 49 Fed. Reg.
20,317 (1984). The Commission concluded that the Fairness Doctrine chilled the speech of
broadcasters and recommended its repeal. See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad-
cast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 148, 182 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Report]. The Commission
based its recommendation on the significantly increased number of broadcast stations existing
today compared to 1949 when it issued the first Fairness Report. Id. at 197, 202-08. Further,
the Commission asserted that advanced technology eliminated scarcity in the spectrum and,
that the Fairness Doctrine actually inhibited the first amendment goal of diversity. Id. at 196-
99, 202. Notwithstanding its findings, however, the Commission continued to enforce the
Fairness Doctrine because there remained an unanswered question whether Congress codified
the doctrine in § 315 of the Communications Act. In Telecommunications Research and Ac-
tion Center (TRAC) v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987),
the D.C. Circuit answered the codification question finding that the Fairness Doctrine was
Commission policy rather than a statutory requirement. Id. at 517-18. Then, in Meredith
Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the D. C. Circuit directed the Commission, on
remand, to consider the first amendment implications of the Fairness Doctrine on Meredith's
station, WTVH. Id. at 874. The Commission found "that the fairness doctrine [was] unconsti-
tutional on its face" and contravened the public interest. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd
5043, 5047 (1987), aff'd on nonconstitutional grounds, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
93. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
94. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
95. See Hyde, FCC Action Repealing the Fairness Doctrine: A Revolution in Broadcast
Regulation, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1175, 1175-76 (1987).
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II. THE MODERN COURT'S INTERPRETATIONS OF "PUBLIC TRUSTEE,"
"SCARCITY" AND THE "DIVERSITY PRINCIPLE"
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,96 a New York journalist filed suit
alleging a violation of the "personal attack" aspect of the Fairness Doctrine
when Red Lion Broadcasting aired a fifteen-minute program in which false
allegations were made regarding the journalist.97 The personal attack rule
requires that when controversial issues are aired and a person's integrity,
honesty, or character are attacked, notice and an opportunity to respond
must be provided.9" When the journalist requested free reply time, however,
Red Lion refused.99 The FCC determined that the broadcast triggered the
personal attack obligations and ordered Red Lion to provide free air time."
Red Lion protested. The Court unanimously held that the FCC acted
within its statutory authority.'01 Furthermore, by virtue of its concern re-
garding spectrum scarcity, and its theory that broadcasters owe a proxy or
fiduciary duty to the public for use of the public airwaves, the Court upheld
the finding in NBC that the broadcaster's first amendment rights are sub-
servient to those of the viewers and listeners.
0 2
In reaching its decision the Red Lion Court expressed its support for the
diversity principle articulated in Associated Press v. United States.10 3 It ob-
served that, in a medium where all could not speak freely, public debate
suffers if station licensees are free to exclude views on public issues or only
permit viewpoints with which they agree. " Such a result would frustrate
the goal implicit in the first amendment that robust and wide open debate
96. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The case involved the "personal attack" rule contained in the
Fairness Doctrine. Id. at 370-7 1. The personal attack rule requires a broadcaster to notify any
person whose character, honesty, integrity or like qualities are attacked during discussions of
controversial issues and to afford that person time to respond. Id. at 373-75.
97. Id. at 371-72.
98. Personal Attacks, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1987).
99. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 371-72.
100. W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 73 (1984). Van
Alstyne contrasts the Red Lion decision with that reached four years later in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), concluding that there exists no "constitution-
ally significant distinctions between Red Lion and Miami Herald." W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra
at 77. For a good layperson's account of the apparent Miami Herald/Red Lion conflict, see F.
FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 192-98 (1975).
101. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01.
102. Id. at 389-90; see CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973) (the
scarcity rationale is sufficient justification for affording the broadcast media a lesser first
amendment right than the traditional press); see also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting (NCCB), 436 U.S. 775, 798-802 (1978); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748 (1978).
103. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
104. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392.
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flourish in the marketplace of ideas."15 However, the Court further warned
that if the net effect of the Fairness Doctrine reduced, rather than enhanced,
speech it might reach a different result. o6
In both NBC and its successor, Red Lion, the Supreme Court held that the
first amendment protected the rights of viewers and listeners over those of
broadcasters. 107 In each case the Court observed that the differences in the
character of the medium determined the applicable first amendment stan-
dard. 0o The Court's rationale in NBC and Red Lion turned on a determina-
tion that in a limited medium where there are more speakers than the
spectrum can accommodate, protecting the speaker's right conflicts with the
first amendment value of an open, competitive marketplace of ideas. Argua-
bly, NBC and Red Lion represent the extreme view with their focus on the
rights of listeners rather than speakers and permitting government limited
regulatory authority over speech.
In contrast, when the emphasis shifts from the listener to the speaker
functioning in an open, self-operating marketplace of ideas, nonintervention
by government promotes the first amendment value of diversity.'°9 The ju-
risprudence governing traditional print media represents this "hands off"
approach to the first amendment with its emphasis on the publisher's right
to control the contents of its newspaper." 0 The Court in Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo .. observed:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper.., and treatment of
public issues . . . constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regu-
lation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First
Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time.' 12
105. Id. at 390.
106. Id. at 393; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). The
Supreme Court recognized a substantial governmental interest in "ensuring adequate and bal-
anced coverage of public issues." Id. at 380. However, the Court noted the growing criticism
of government regulations based on spectrum scarcity. Id. at 376 n. 11. The Court refused to
reconsider the scarcity rationale without "some signal from Congress or the FCC that techno-
logical developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regu-
lation may be required." Id. Moreover, the Court affirmed its willingness to reconsider the
constitutional question presented in Red Lion if the Commission demonstrated that the Fair-
ness Doctrine reduced rather than enhanced speech. Id. at 378 n. 12.
107. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216, 226-27 (1943); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
108. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); Quincy Cable
TV Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
109. See Bazelon, supra note 14, at 204.
110. Id. at 202.
Ill. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
112. Id. at 258. For an analysis of the "right of reply" laws, see Polsby, Candidate Access
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Miami Herald involved a Florida statute requiring newspapers publishing
a personal attack on a qualified candidate for public office to provide reply
space."' The Miami Herald refused to provide reply space and challenged
the Florida statute as an unconstitutional abridgment of its right to publish
free of government interference.'1 14 The Circuit Court of Dade County, held
that the statute violated the first amendment and dismissed the case with
prejudice."' 5 The Florida Supreme Court reversed finding no constitutional
violation.' 6 The Florida Supreme Court found that the right-of-reply stat-
ute enhanced free speech and furthered the " 'broad societal interest in the
free flow of information to the public.' ""' However, the Supreme Court,
without mentioning Red Lion, unanimously reversed the Florida court's de-
cision,"' thus solidifying the long standing view that the first amendment
bars any governmental interference in the printed press. The Court observed
that " 'liberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries to com-
pel what is to go into a newspaper.' "9
The Supreme Court's decision in Miami Herald represents the opposite
view of that expressed in NBC and Red Lion. In Miami Herald the Court
rejected arguments that economic conditions barred entry into the newspa-
per business. 120 Thus, by failing to distinguish Red Lion, or explain why
to the Air: The Uncertain Future of Broadcaster Discretion, 8 Sup. CT. REV. 223 (1981); The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term: Political Candidate's Statutory Right of Reply to Newspaper Edito-
rials, 88 HARV. L. REV. 174 (1974); Comment, Reply and Retraction in Actions Against the
Press for Defamation: The Effect of Tornillo and Gertz, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 223 (1974);
Note, Reaffirming the Freedom of the Press. Another Look at Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 73 MICH. L. REV. 186 (1974); Note, Access v. Fairness in Newspapers: The Implica-
tions of Tornillo for a Free and Responsible Press, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 954 (1974).
113. 418 U.S. at 243-44. The larger issue went beyond the Florida statute and involved
direct government intervention in the editorial process of the printed press. Id. at 256. Appel-
lee argued that because the Florida statute did not prevent the Miami Herald from publishing
anything, but rather, required it to publish additional material it did not offend the paper's first
amendment right to speak. Id. However, the Supreme Court found that:
Compelling editors or publishers to publish that which "'reason' tells them should
not be published" . . . operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or
regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified matter. Governmental restraint
on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to consti-
tutional limitations on governmental powers.
Id. (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1936)).
114. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 245.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 245-46.
117. Id. at 245 (quoting Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 82 (Fla.
1973)).
118. Id. at 258.
119. Id. at 258 n.24 (quoting 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
633 (1947)).
120. Id. at 251.
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
economic conditions, which barred entry to the information market as effec-
tively as the limited spectrum did in broadcasting, the Court left "economic
scarcity" outside the scope of legitimate government interests.12 1 The
Court's decision to uphold government mandated access to the electronic
media under the FCC's personal attack rules, and strike down a Florida
personal attack statute mandating access to a newspaper, cannot be recon-
ciled except by looking at the medium involved. Unless there exists a limit
on the forum tantamount to the spectrum scarcity found in broadcasting, the
first amendment bars government involvement in speech. 1 22 As new commu-
nication technologies arose, the issue for the courts became whether a given
technology more closely resembled the broadcast or print model, the resolu-
tion of which, in turn, determined the allowable level of government regula-
tion of the medium.
III. AN ILLUSTRATION IN JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY: CHOOSING AN
APPROPRIATE FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARD
FOR NEW TECHNOLOGIES
The advent of new technologies requires the courts to determine in each
instance the applicable first amendment model to apply.1 23 Proponents of
active government involvement in regulating new technologies argue for ex-
panding the scarcity rationale applicable to broadcasting to include other
forms of scarce resources. 124 In contrast, proponents of the hands-off or
print model attempt to characterize the role of a particular new technology
as that of a publisher, with emphasis on editorial control.
125
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc. 126 provides a strik-
ing example of an attempt to place a new technology within the broadcasting
model of the first amendment. 27 In Preferred, the only cable case to come
121. See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 100, at 194-95. The Supreme Court rejected the right of
access arguments that "government has an obligation to ensure that a wide variety of views
reach the public." Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 248. Access advocates maintain that the intro-
duction of television, radio, cable television and communications satellites have changed the
concept of the free printed press known in 1791 when the first amendment was adopted,
thereby warranting affirmative government intervention to protect the interest of the public.
Id. at 248-51. Because of the concentration in the newspaper industry and the economics of
the business, access advocates would find a fiduciary duty on the part of newspapers to act in
the public interest under government supervision. Id. at 251.
122. See W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 100, at 74-75; see also F. FRIENDLY, supra note
100, at 192-98.
123. See supra notes 18-19.
124. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
125. See infra note 127 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying note 136.
126. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
127. See Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403-04
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before the Supreme Court since enactment of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984,128 a prospective cable operator brought a first amend-
ment action challenging a city ordinance restricting the number of cable sys-
tems in the South Central District of Los Angeles to a single franchisee. 29
The city argued that the "physical scarcity" of space on utility poles for
hanging cable and the limited economic demand-"economic scarcity"-for
a second cable system serving Los Angeles, as well as the disruptive effect on
the public streets of installing a second cable system, together brought cable
television within the ambit of governmental regulations applicable to
broadcasting. 130
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
dismissed the complaint without leave to amend, finding as a matter of law
that the city's franchise rule did not violate the cable operator's first amend-
ment rights.13' However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed.' 32 The Ninth Circuit declined to apply the broadcast stan-
(9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); see also Group W Cable, Inc.
v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954, 961 (N.D. Cal. 1987), "[T]he starting point for the
Court's analysis is that unless cable television differs in some material respect from the print
media, the First Amendment standards that apply to newspapers apply with equal force to
cable." Id. The district court rejected the "physical scarcity" rationale for limiting pole access
to a single cable system. Id. at 960; Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465,
1470 (N.D. Cal. 1986) "We recognize that 'differences in the characteristics of new media
justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.' . .. Application of a
lesser standard of protection, however, is an exception to the rule that must be justified by a
particular difference." Id. (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1974)). "The threshold issue ... is whether the first amendment allows the government the
same wide latitude in regulating the CTV industry as it allows in the broadcast medium or
whether the degree of protection should be closer to that enjoyed by the traditional media,
such as newspapers." Id. (citations omitted).
128. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. III 1985)).
Congress amended the Communications Act in 1984 to bring cable television under the juris-
diction of the FCC. Prior to passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, the
Supreme Court recognized FCC authority to regulate cable as "ancillary" to other FCC regu-
latory powers over broadcasting granted in the Communications Act. United States v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-78 (1968). In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467
U.S. 691 (1984), the Court expanded Southwestern and found direct authority to regulate cable
in the Communications Act itself. Id. at 699-700; see 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982 & Supp. III
1985) (FCC jurisdiction applied to "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or ra-
dio"). While giving primary authority to the FCC, the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 relies on local authorities to grant franchisees the use of streets and rights-of-way. See
generally 47 U.S.C. § 541 (general franchise requirements).
129. 467 U.S. at 490-91. The city required that all cable operators obtain a cable television
franchise prior to operating within a given region. The city permitted only one cable operator
per region. Id.
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dard to cable television, noting that each new medium of expression requires
a different first amendment standard 133 and that "[diespite the superficial
similarity between broadcasting and cable television . . . [t]he Supreme
Court's determination to allow greater government intrusion into the affairs
of broadcasters rests on the physical scarcity of radiowaves."1 34 Physical and
economic scarcity, according to the Ninth Circuit, do not justify the same
first amendment standard applicable to broadcasting. 13  Rejecting the
broadcast standard set out in Red Lion, the circuit court expressed the view
that cable operators exercised editorial control analogous to print publishers
and applied the standard of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.,
3 6
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings on the first amendment question.13 7 The Court
noted that the first amendment protects cable operators as well as broadcast-
ers, notwithstanding the fact that by reason of spectrum scarcity broadcast-
ers enjoy a limited right subject to government regulation.' 31 Moreover, the
Court analyzed the editorial control over content that a cable operator exer-
cised and found it more akin to that of a publisher or pamphleteer. 1 9 How-
ever, without a fully developed record the Supreme Court affirmed the
circuit court on narrower grounds.' 4
Courts continue to debate the extent to which government can regulate
consistent with the first amendment. 4 ' As the Supreme Court observed in
133. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.
1985), aff'd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488, 492 (1986).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1404-05; see also Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449-50 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). The D.C. Circuit recognized that the " 'scarcity
rationale' ha[d] no place in evaluating government regulation of cable television." Id. at 1449.
The court noted that "technological advances may have rendered the 'scarcity rationale' obso-
lete even for broadcasters." Id. at 1442 n.32.
136. Preferred, 476 U.S. at 492-93.
137. Id. at 496.
138. Id. at 494-95; see also Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1447-48. In Quincy, the D. C. Circuit
disallowed the economic scarcity rationale for affording cable television a lesser first amend-
ment standard. Id. at 1450. "[T]he Supreme Court has categorically rejected the suggestion
that purely economic constraints on the number of voices available in a given community
justify otherwise unwarranted intrusions into First Amendment rights." Id. In addition, the
court rejected the physical scarcity rationale. Id. at 1448-49.
139. Preferred, 476 U.S. at 494.
140. Id.
141. Compare cases cited supra note 127 with Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of
Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 602 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988)(The court
rejected the cable franchisee's argument that the franchise agreement "singled out" cable from
other first amendment speakers. The lower court found that the "distinct personality" of cable
television required "individualized regulation.") and Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI
Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986) (Although primarily an antitrust case, the
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Red Lion, "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences
in the First Amendment standards applied to them." '42 This observation
precludes blanket application of broadcast first amendment doctrines to new
technologies. 143 Unlike broadcast media, in which spectrum scarcity pro-
vided a conceptual justification for regulation, new technologies hold the po-
tential for unlimited modes of self expression. 1" As the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed with reference to
cable television " 'an essential precondition of [broadcast] theory-physical
interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is ab-
sent.' ,145 It follows that, absent spectrum scarcity, first amendment stan-
dards developed for broadcasters do not apply to new technologies.
IV. THE CHANGING FACE OF BROADCASTING AND
THE SCARCITY JUSTIFICATION
Even as the courts have refused to extend the broadcast rationale to
emerging technologies, changes in the older broadcast technologies have un-
dermined the scarcity justification. Since the Supreme Court's 1969 decision
in Red Lion, the number of radio and television stations has increased dra-
matically. 14 6 In addition, the personal computer alone introduced a variety
decision involved a franchise renewal. The court denied the first amendment challenge, finding
cable's natural monopoly justified exclusive cable franchises.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910
(1987).
142. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); see also Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768
F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
143. Preferred Communication, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.
1985), aff'd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); see also Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,
768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). The Quincy court
explained that "sensitivity to the uniqueness of each medium precludes facile adoption of the
First Amendment jurisprudence that has developed around challenges to FCC regulation of
broadcast television and radio." Id.
144. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1448, 1450. In Quincy the D. C. Circuit found that requiring
cable operators to carry broadcast signals violated cable operators' first amendment rights. Id.
at 1453-54. The court observed that "(u]nlike ordinary broadcast television, which transmits
the video image over airwaves capable of bearing only a limited number of signals, cable
reaches the home over a coaxial cable with the technological capacity to carry 200 or more
channels." Id. at 1448. The court found this fundamental distinction significant because where
spectrum scarcity exists "the First Amendment tolerates far more intrusive regulation." Id.
145. Id. at 1449 (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9. 44-45 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)).
146. "[T]he number of radio stations has increased by '280 percent since the Commission's
1949 Fairness Report; 48 percent since the Supreme Court's 1969 Red Lion decision; and 30
percent since the Commission's 1974 Fairness Report.'" Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd
5043, 5067 n.160 (1987), aff'd on nonconstitutional grounds, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (citation omitted). At the time the Court handed down its decision in Red Lion, there
existed 577 VHF stations, and 260 UHF stations. See FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING, supra
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of new means of delivering information. 147 For example, the proliferation of
computers changed traditional notions of the print publisher. Desk top pub-
lishing, electronic publishing, information services, information retrieval sys-
tems, on-line libraries, electronic mail, voice mail, and networking are now
common phenomena.'4' Even the idea of the public billboard changed to
incorporate sophisticated electronic message boards. Public policies founded
on principles developed in the 1920's no longer offer the flexibility needed to
keep pace with the rapidly changing technological environment.
149
Moreover, dividing the spectrum no longer presents the obstacles that it
once did. Indeed, in 1980 the FCC considered increasing the number of
radio stations by reducing the bandwidth required from 10 kHz to 9 kHz. 1
50
In 1982, the FCC increased the number of available television stations by
creating a class of low-power stations. 1' With the introduction of the home
satellite receiver, direct broadcast satellites deliver additional television pro-
gramming into the home.' 52
note 21, at 13. As of March 27, 1989, operating stations totaled 670 VHF stations, 741 UHF
stations and 283 applications pending for new stations. Weekly Television Action Update, Ad-
denda to Television & Cable Factbook, March 27, 1989.
147. See The Computer MovesIn: By the Millions, It Is Beeping Its Way Into Offices,
Schools and Homes, Time, Jan. 3, 1983, at 14 (Time's "Man of the Year" cover was dedicated
to the personal computer as "Machine of the Year" describing the dawning of a new world.);
see also A Terminal in Every Home?, Time, Sept. 13, 1982, at 65 (discussing "electronic yellow
pages").
148. See E. DIAMOND, N. SANDLER & M. MUELLER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN CRISIS:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND DEREGULATION 51 (1983). The list does not
pretend to exhaust all the new technological developments or changes those developments
imposed on the language.
149. Id. at 107-09 (discussing the problem of "regulatory obsolescence" rendering telecom-
munications regulation to piecemeal legislation). See generally I. POOL, supra note 21, at 231-
34.
150. See 9 kHz Channel Spacing for AM Broadcasting, 88 F.C.C.2d 290 (1981). For a
discussion of the history and goals of the AM/FM expansion proposal, including broadcasters'
resistance on competitive grounds, see E. DIAMOND, N. SANDLER & M. MUELLER, supra note
148, at 24-26; see also I. POOL, supra note 21, at 152.
151. See Inquiry Into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broadcasting and Televi-
sion Translators in the National Telecommunications System, 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 467
(1982), recon., 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1267 (1983). The FCC selects competing applicants by
lottery. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3572(f)(2)(i-iv) (1987). From September 29, 1983 when the FCC con-
ducted the first lottery to the end of 1987, it authorized in excess of 1,600 low power television
(LPTV) station construction permits. In addition, FCC regulations applicable to full-power
very high frequency (VHF) stations do not apply equally to low power stations. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 74.732(b),(h) (1987). For example, neither cross-ownership nor multiple ownership restric-
tions apply to low-power licensees. Id. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's
separate regulatory structure for low-power broadcasters and its allocation of channels to low-
power service. Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
152. The FCC adopted interim rules for Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS), Inquiry into
the Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites for the Period
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These technological developments have altered the significance of the fun-
damental reference point of broadcast regulation-the limited electromag-
netic spectrum. What has traditionally been called broadcasting now
comprises only a small part of the larger information world, and must in-
creasingly compete with a variety of other media voices. 15 3 Rather than ex-
pressing alarm about diminished diversity in the broadcast spectrum, courts
should focus on the information marketplace as a whole. Critics argue, how-
ever, that television's power and effectiveness in reaching the consumer pub-
lic far surpasses any other technologies currently in use.154 Therefore, as
"public trustees," broadcasters must continue to adhere to the public inter-
est. 155 But as Judge Bork wrote in Telecommunications Research and Action
Center (TRAC) v. FCC,15 6 "we are unwilling to endorse an argument that
makes the very effectiveness of speech the justification for according it less
first amendment protection."
1 57
In TRA C, the D. C. Circuit challenged the scarcity rationale. 58 In an
opinion written by Judge Bork, in which Judge Scalia joined, the court ob-
served that scarcity is too thin a distinction to sustain content regulation
because scarcity exists in all resources.159 Absent viable distinctions among
the various scarce resources required to communicate, Judge Bork and
Following the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982), va-
cated in part, National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and
granted construction permits to 8 DBS applicants. In 1984, the D. C. Circuit upheld the
Commission's interim regulations finding DBS services a form of broadcasting as defined in the
Communications Act. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1201, 1222; see also United
States Satellite Broadcasting Co. v. FCC; .740 F.2d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
153. "The United States of course does not suffer from a paucity of information. Newspa-
pers, television and radio stations and networks, cable services, magazines, libraries, and other
information sources exist in number and quality unmatched elsewhere." United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 589 n.288 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 87-5388 and
consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1987).
154. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The FCC "issued a declaratory
order granting [a] complaint" against Pacifica for airing a twelve-minute monologue by
George Carlin containing seven "filthy words." Id. at 729-30. The Supreme Court upheld the
Commission's decision on two theories: first, the "pervasive presence" of broadcast media, id.
at 748; second, that "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read." Id. at 749. "The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material,
coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent
broadcasting." Id. at 750. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968), the Supreme
Court held that a legitimate governmental interest exists in protecting the well-being of chil-
dren and in supporting parents' authority over their home. Id. at 639-40.
155. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
156. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (TRAC).
157. Id. at 508.
158. Id. at 508-09.
159. Id. at 508.
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others argued, I" the spectrum scarcity rational no longer supported broad-
cast regulation based on content. 161 The circuit court warned that with the
introduction of newer technologies the scarcity rationale would "inevitably
lead[ ] to strained reasoning and artificial results." 162 The market would nec-
essarily attain the required information diversity sought by regulation
through the ebb and flow of natural forces. 163 Each new medium of expres-
sion would serve to balance every other mode of communication and lead to
the "free trade in ideas" that Justice Holmes envisioned when he argued
"that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market . . . . '
The history of broadcast and cable regulation suggests that as new com-
munication technologies become available Congress and the courts will fail
to fully comprehend how the first amendment limits government authority
to regulate. 1 65 In fact, at first, the courts will attempt to characterize users of
the new medium as someone other than a speaker entitled to full first
amendment protection166 or, as a speaker entitled to some lessor protected
right. 167 The complexity of new technology and in some cases the evolution
of old technology tends to leave courts wanting for familiarity. 168 Moreover,
familiarity exists in broadcasting and the scarcity rationale, which in turn
support intrusive government involvement in the medium. 169 Therefore, un-
til a new technology becomes familiar in its own right, courts generally at-
160. Id. at 508-09; see also Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regu-
lation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982).
161. See Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules, the Broadcast Multi-
ple Ownership Rules, 2 FCC Red 1138 (1987).
[G]rowth in the number of media outlets on a national basis is also occurring on a
local basis ... [and] generally the growth in the number of radio stations has oc-
curred throughout the various radio markets.
We [the FCC] believe that this growth in the number of radio and television sta-
tions on a local basis has greatly increased competition and made it less likely that
the common ownership of radio-television combinations in the same market would
raise the same concerns over potential concentration of control or diversity of view-
point problems as it would have fifteen years ago.
Id. at 1140.
162. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 508.
163. E. DIAMOND, N. SANDLER & M. MUELLER, supra note 148, at 52-53.
164. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
165. L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 216-17 (1987);
see also E. DIAMOND, N. SANDLER & M. MUELLER, supra note 148, at 107-09.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 171-75.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 123-45. For a complete discussion of the develop-
ing regulatory structure of cable television and its relationship to the broadcast regulatory
structure, see L. POWE, supra note 165, at 216-47.
168. See L. POWE, supra note 165, at 246-47.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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tempt to impute the regulatory baggage of an existing medium, leaving
unresolved the difficult constitutional issues.17 ° The courts' reluctance to re-
solve the novel first amendment issues presented by the AT&T divestiture-
in which the telephone company, formerly operating solely as a common
carrier, suddenly emerged as part speaker and part common carrier-dem-
onstrates courts' unwillingness to decide difficult constitutional issues by ap-
plying forward-thinking principles to new media of expression.
V. COMMON CARRIERS: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T AND
RESTRUCTURING THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
By definition, a common carrier' 7 ' acts for hire to provide communication
services over wire or radio on an indiscriminate basis for the transmission of
information chosen by the customer."' Common carrier regulation seeks to
structurally ensure universal service and nondiscriminatory access to the
carrier's facilities.' 73 The right of access distinguishes common carriers from
other communication media."" Therefore, the government historically re-
frained from regulating content over common carrier systems, except to pro-
hibit obscene or harassing telephone calls.
17 1
Title II of the Communications Act 17 6 provides the statutory framework
for common carrier regulation under the jurisdiction of the FCC. 177 The
170. See infra text accompanying notes 215-19.
171. "'Common carier' or 'carier' means any person engaged as a common carrier for
hire, in interstate or foreign communications by wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio
transmission of energy .... 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982); see also National Ass'n of Regulatory
Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976)
(NARUC 1).
172. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(h), 201(a) (1982); see also National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (NARUC If). But see Carlin Com-
munications, Inc. v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1987) (refusal to
sell service to alleged indecent service upheld), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988). A common
carrier's obligation to provide service on demand requires it to strive to anticipate demand and
meet that demand upon reasonable request. Coastal Auto Parts, Inc. v. Coastal Util., Inc., 20
F.C.C.2d 316, 317 (1969); see 47 U.S.C. § 201(a). A common carrier holds itself out to pro-
vide service on an indiscriminate basis. 47 U.S.C. § 202. Where a carrier makes individual-
ized decisions concerning "whether and on what terms to deal," it will not be considered a
common carrier under the Act. NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at 641.
173. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(b), 201(a),(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
174. See generally CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103-14 (1973) (compar-
ing the broadcast regulatory scheme with common carrier regulation and discussing the rele-
vant legislative history of the Comunications Act.).
175. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
176. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
177. See id; see generally Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1939) (the Commu-
nications Act extended the Radio Commission's jurisdiction to include the telephone and
telegraph).
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Communications Act requires a carrier proposing service to obtain prior
Commission certification.' 78 Before granting a carrier's proposed service re-
quest, the Commission must find it "necessary or desirable in the public
interest."' 7 9
Unlike their approach in broadcasting, when Congress and the courts de-
veloped the legal framework for telegraphy and telephony operating as com-
mon carriers, they overlooked the relevance of the first amendment. 8 ° The
nineteenth century law developed to regulate the railroad, a common carrier
transporting goods and services, provided the legal theory underpinning tele-
phone regulation.' 18 By applying railroad law to the early telegraphy and
telephony cases, the Court caused more than 100 years of regulation to de-
178. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a).
179. Id. at § 201(a); see also Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 774 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
180. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. In 1893 and 1894, the two basic tele-
phone patents held by the Bell system expired, leading to an influx of entrepreneurs into the
telephone business, anxious to capitalize on the new industry and available technology. R.
BORNHOLZ & D. EVANS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE IN-
DUSTRY, BREAKING Up BELL 11 (1983). In 1894, 87 independent telephone companies began
service. By 1902, in excess of 4000 independents offered some form of telephone service. Id.
However, as early as 1885, the Bell system controlled the major part of the telephone industry,
id., and prohibited its local operating companies from connecting their exchanges with any of
the independents. Id. at 10, 13. Many cities, states and the federal government began requiring
telephone companies operating within their territories to obtain a license. Prior to issuance of
a license, the telephone company had to demonstrate that it would operate the proposed ser-
vice "in the public convenience." I. POOL, supra note 21, at 102. Under the "public conven-
ience" standard, the regulatory body would deny licenses when phone service already existed
in a community. Id.; see Celina & Mercer County Tel. Co. v. Union-Center Mutual Tel.
Ass'n., 102 Ohio St. 487, 499, 133 N.E. 540, 544 (1921). In Celina, the Supreme Court of Ohio
decided the case without reference to the first amendment and concluded that both companies
were common carriers and that in the case of a utility, the government could decide whether
the public interest was better served by having competition or not. Id. at 495-99, 133 N.E. at
543-44; see also I. POOL, supra note 21, at 102. If government attempted to regulate competing
newspapers under a "public convenience" standard, the courts would find a violation of the
first amendment. However, prior to the MFJ decision, see supra note 3, even though the tele-
phone system constituted an instrument of speech, no court considered the first amendment in
rendering a decision. See I. POOL, supra note 21, at 103. In FCC v. RCA Communications,
Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953), the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's authority under the
Communications Act to license common carriers on finding the "public convenience, interest,
or necessity" served. Id. at 90. However, the Court disagreed with the FCC license grant and
remanded the case to the FCC for a determination of whether more competition in the radio-
telegraph business met the public convenience standard. Id. at 91-92, 94-96, 98. Nowhere in
its decision did the Court consider the first amendment implications of the Commission's au-
thority to grant or deny a license to RCA.
181. See Pensacola Tel. Co. V. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1878). The
Supreme Court determined that the power to regulate the telephone industry as a common
carrier was found in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
For a lengthy description of the legislative history of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1897 and
its incorporation into Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, see American Broadcasting
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velop lacking any consideration of potential first amendment issues. 18 2 Like-
wise, until Judge Harold Greene entered judgment in the Modification of
Final Judgment (MFJ) the diversity principle never applied to the telephone
industry.
18 3
Prior to the MFJ decision, AT&T, restricted to offering common carrier
services as a regulated monopoly, built a sophisticated nationwide telecom-
munications network. The MFJ restructured AT&T, requiring divestiture of
its telecommunications holdings in the private intercity telephone service
markets."8 4 The MFJ effected a complete restructuring of the telecommuni-
cations market. s5 Competition, rather than regulated monopoly, would
drive the new structure. AT&T and the twenty-two divested BOC's would
now compete in a dynamic industry that no longer confined itself to provid-
ing basic telephone service to customers.' 8 6 The new telecommunications
industry included an array of electronic services that could provide poten-
tially limitless avenues of communication. 8 7 The various services, dubbed
"electronic publishing,"' 8 crossed all boundaries: television, public fora,
newspapers, and audio, data, text and two-way interactive services, that per-
mit users to access large libraries of information. 8 9 The restructuring of the
telecommunications industry, and the advent of these new services, required
Co. v. FCC, 643 F.2d 818, 820-22 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also I. POOL, supra note 21, at 101,
103.
182. Had the courts treated the telephone as an extension of the newspaper (printed word),
rather than of a railroad (a transportation system for words), an entirely different legal struc-
ture might exist. The telephone would enjoy all the liberties of the press guaranteed under the
first amendment, free from governmental restriction. However, as a common carrier, unlike
the press, all persons wishing to enter the telephone market by opening new and competing
lines of speech must seek prior approval of a non-elected governmental body. See supra text
accompanying notes 178-79; see also Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(reversing a Commission decision to permit competition in leased-line service, holding that
"[w]hen the FCC considers an application for certification of a new line, it must... determine
whether indeed the public convenience and necessity require more or better service" Id. at
776).
183. For a further explanation of the distinction between AT&T and the MFJ, see supra
note 3. The MFJ represents the consent decree entered into between AT&T and the DOJ
which was subsequently approved by Judge Harold Greene in United States v. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
184. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131.
185. See id. at 226-27, 194-95; DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 12, 16-17.
186. DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 12.
187. Id. at 111-12; Huber Report, infra note 227, at chs. 6-13.
188. For a definition of electronic publishing, see supra note 4. Information services in-
cludes the concept of electronic publishing. The MFJ decision defines information services as
"the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, re-
trieving, utilizing, or making available information which may be conveyed via telecommuni-
cations .... " AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 179, 229.
189. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 181 nn.207-08.
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a reexamination of the traditional common carrier mode of regulating. The
traditional passive carrier, forced to compete in a dynamic communications
market, began asserting its rights as a constitutionally protected speaker.190
A. Recognizing First Amendment Implications in Common Carrier
Decisions: The Information Services Prohibition and the
Diversity Principle
In AT&T1 91 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
for the first time in a common carrier case, considered the first amendment
relevant in rendering a decision.192 The case arose in 1974 when the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against AT&T and Western Electric. The
DOJ charged the defendants with illegal use of monopoly power to impede
competition in the telecommunications equipment and private intercity tele-
phone service markets in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.193 The government sought to break up the AT&T monopoly by requir-
ing divestiture of the BOC's and Western Electric.'
94
After six years of pretrial discovery and one year of trial the DOJ and
AT&T proposed settlement of the 1974 suit by consent decree.'9 The settle-
ment proposal provided for structural changes amounting to divestiture of
the twenty-two BOC's which perform local telephone services.' 96 AT&T
190. See generally United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 n.273 (D.D.C.
1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-5388 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1987) (afford-
ing no cognizable first amendment protection to common carriers and admonishing the BOC's
for attempting to "bootstrap" their argument for removal of the MFJ's information prohibi-
tion into an infringement on their first amendment rights). For a discussion of the history of
common carrier regulation and lack of first amendment protection, see supra notes 180-82 and
accompanying text.
191. 552 F. Supp. at 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
192. Id. at 181. The court, though recognizing that its decision implicated first amendment
doctrines, approved the MFJ prohibiting the divested BOC's from providing information serv-
ices. Id. at 227. "[N]o BOC shall, directly or through any affiliated enterprise ... provide
interexchange telecommunications services or information services .... Id. The information
services included in the prohibition included, among other things, "pay television, radio and
television broadcasting, and electronic publications which appear either by audio means, on
video screens, or in printed form." Id. at 181 n.208.
193. Id. at 139. For a listing of the principle opinions leading up to the MFJ decision, see
AT&T 552 F. Supp. at 135 n.1.
194. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 139. The breakup of the AT&T monopoly remained one of the
principle objectives of the DOJ throughout the proceedings. Id. at 139 n.20, 160.
195. Id. at 139-41. Pretrial proceedings began in February, 1975 and continued until the
trial itself, which began on January 15, 1981. Id. at 139-40. After opening statements, the
parties requested a recess and for the next six weeks tried to reach a settlement. Id. After
settlement efforts failed, trial resumed on March 4, 1981. Id. at 140. Ten months later, on
January 8, 1982, the parties settled and filed the Modified Consent Decree with the court. Id.
at 140-41.
196. Id. at 141-42, 226-27.
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would also provide the local BOC's and seven newly created Regional Hold-
ing Companies (RHC's) with sufficient assets to perform telecommunica-
tions services in their respective geographical areas.197 In addition, the
settlement would guarantee equal access by AT&T and other common car-
ers, such as MCI, to the BOC's local telephone network19 8 and prohibit the
BOC's from, among other things, providing information services.' 99 Finally,
the proposed settlement would vacate a 1956 decree enjoining AT&T from
providing any services other than common carrier communications. 2" The
district court accepted the proposed settlement after making certain modifi-
cations and on August 11, 1982, entered final judgment approving the con-
sent decree. 20 ' Refusing to review the decree, the Supreme Court summarily
affirmed the district court's order.20 2 The consent decree became operative
on January 1, 1984, effectively restructuring the telecommunications
industry.2 °3
The district court approved the post-divestiture restrictions, which were
agreed to by AT&T in the consent decree, on the newly divested BOC's on
the assumption that, if permitted, they would possess both the incentive and
opportunity to use their monopoly power to act anticompetitively.2°4 The
court conceded the anticompetitive effect of the MFJ's prohibition excluding
the twenty-two BOC's and seven RHC's205 from entering the information
marketplace.20 6 However, it concluded that the BOC's and RHC's were not
needed in the already competitive information market.20 7
197. Id. at 142, 226.
198. Id. at 142-43, 227.
199. Id. at 143, 227-28.
200. Id. at 143, 178, 226. In 1956, AT&T and the DOJ settled, by consent decree, similar
charges involving violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); see United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956). The 1956 decree
precluded AT&T and the BOC's from offering any services other than common carrier com-
munications and confined Western Electric's equipment manufacturing to that used by the Bell
System. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 137-38, 178 & n.196. In addition, the decree required the
defendants to license patents held by the Bell System to all applicants on payment of royalties.
Id. at 138, 176.
201. See id. at 231-32.
202. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
203. AT&T filed its proposed "plan of reorganization," in accordance with the district
court's order, United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom.
California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983), and designated Local Access and Transport
Areas (LATA's) in which the divested BOC's would operate. United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 993 (D.D.C. 1983).
204. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 187.
205. The divestiture created seven Regional Holding Companies (RHC's) and 22 Bell Op-
erating Companies. Western Elec., 569 F. Supp. at 1062 n.5.
206. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 187.
207. Id. at 189 n.234, 190 n.241. "The Operating Companies would simply be additional
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The court reasoned that because information service providers required
use of the telecommunications network controlled by the BOC's, a potential
risk existed that the BOC's would cross-subsidize their own information ser-
vice to the disadvantage of its competitors.2" 8 Moreover, the circumstances
would give the BOC's the incentive to discriminate by restricting competi-
tors' access to the local networks they controlled.2 °9 The court maintained
that the exclusion of the BOC's from providing information services over
their own telephone networks would turn their incentive to designing a tele-
communications network that could "accommodate the maximum number
of information service providers."2 1 Thus, the court found that prohibiting
the BOC's from becoming electronic publishers enhanced competition, fur-
thered the principles of the antitrust laws and served the public interest.2 1'
Moreover, the court adopted an impossible standard for removing the infor-
mation prohibition placed on the BOC's.212 Under the new standard: "[t]he
restrictions imposed upon the separated BOC's ... shall be removed upon a
showing by the petitioning BOC that there is no substantial possibility that it
could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the market it seeks
to enter.",
213
competitors in a market that is already quite competitive." Id. at 189 n.234. Moreover, the
court acknowledged that if permitted to enter competitive markets, the BOC's would "be faced
with the most potent conceivable competitor: AT&T itself." Id. at 187. The proposed consent
decree approved by the parties would have permitted AT&T to enter the electronic publishing
market. The court, however, in the final judgment, temporarily prohibited AT&T from offer-
ing information services for seven years. Id. at 231. The court anticipated that the seven-year
restriction would allow competition to develop in what it considered an infant industry. Id. at
186. The seven-year restriction expires August 24, 1989 unless opposition parties can prove
that the market continues to lack sufficient competition to allow AT&T's entry. See id. at 186
n.224, 231. On April 23, 1989, AT&T moved the court to relax the information restriction in
accordance with § VIII(D) of the MFJ. AT&T's Motion to Remove Section VIII(D) of the
Decree, United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 23, 1989).
208. Id. at 188-89. The district court failed to reconcile its speculation that the BOC's
could discriminate against other service providers, id. at 187, with the MFJ's imposed equal
access requirements on the divested companies. Id. at 196, 227. The equal access require-
ments directed the BOC's to provide network access "equal in type, quality and price" to the
access services provided to AT&T and its affiliates. Id. at 227. The court described section
II(A) of the Decree as a "broad guarantee of equal treatment, [which] when implemented, will
effectively remove any interconnection-type obstacles to free competition between AT&T and
the other carriers." Id. at 196. The court thus concluded "that all interexchange and informa-
tion service providers will be able to compete on an equal basis." Id. at 195.
209. Id. at 187.
210. Id. at 189.
211. Id. at 189-90.
212. See id. at 231; see also DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 50-54.
213. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 532 (D.D.C. 1987), appeal
docketed, No. 87-5388 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1987); AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
at 194-95, 231; DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 16, 50.
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After recognizing the first amendment implications of its decision,214 the
district court concluded that permitting the divested companies to engage in
electronic publishing would pose a substantial threat to other electronic pub-
lishers.215 Therefore, in the interest of diversity, the court approved the MFJ
prohibiting the BOC's from entering the market.216 The court approved the
content restrictions on AT&T and the divested BOC's, imposed by the MFJ,
on what might be termed a "competitive scarcity" theory.217 By relying on
the theory applicable to broadcast regulation, in which the government in-
terest in regulating content outweighed a speaker's first amendment rights by
reason of spectrum scarcity,218 the court equated competitive scarcity to
spectrum scarcity and found that the information restrictions furthered the
public interest.2 9
214. AT&T 552 F. Supp. at 183.
215. The court relied on its rationale for restricting AT&T's involvement in electronic pub-
lishing to support the ban on the BOC's. Id. at 190 n.239 (cross referencing Part VI of the
decision, id. at 178-86). However, the court imposed a complete ban on the BOC's, see id. at
231, whereas AT&T was permitted to enter the information market after seven years. See
supra note 207.
216. Id. at 183-85.
217. The district court feared that the "mere presence [of AT&T and the divested BOC's]
in the electronic publishing area would be likely to deter other potential competitors from even
entering the market." Id. at 182. Thus, according to the court, the information restriction was
"necessary to permit the development of competition in the [information] market .... " Id. at
185; see also id. at 189-90. But see supra note 207 and accompanying text.
This Comment distinguishes between competitive scarcity and economic scarcity. Eco-
nomic scarcity refers to economic barriers making entry into a market nearly impossible for all
except major corporations. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250-51
(1974); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404-05 (9th
Cir. 1985), aff'd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). The Supreme Court specifically
rejected the economic scarcity rationale for finding a lessor first amendment right in the print
industry. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 254-58. As used in this Comment, competitive scarcity
identifies the general lack of competitors in an industry or market notwithstanding entry
barriers.
218. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 183-84.
219. See id. at 184. The court likened itself to the FCC in regulating content to promote the
public interest in "diversity." Id. Moreover, according to the district court, the diversity prin-
ciple, previously never applied only because an industry tended toward concentration, see
Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 251, 257-58, required the imposition of an information ban on the
newly divested BOC's. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 184.
Diversity has disappeared in many areas; newspapers have gone out of business;
others have merged; and much of the flow of news and editorial opinion appears
more and more to be controlled and shaped by the three television networks and a
handful of news magazines and metropolitan newspapers.
This concentration presents obvious dangers .... Unless care is taken, both the
concentration and the attendant dangers will be significantly increased by the new
technologies. Indeed, it is not at all inconceivable that electronic publishing, with its
speed and convenience will eventually overshadow the more traditional news media
.... AT&T's [and the BOC's] ability.., to reduce or eliminate competition in the
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B. The MFJ Triennial Review: An Opportunity Missed
In approving the terms of the MFJ, the district court retained authority to
enforce the provisions of the decree by providing for a triennial review.22° In
accordance with the triennial review process, on February 2, 1987 the DOJ
filed its Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the
Line of Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the
Modification of Final Judgment (DOJ Report).221 The DOJ advocated elimi-
nation of the information service prohibition.222 It found that FCC regula-
tions-specifically Computer Inquiry 111,223 and joint and common cost
allocation rulemaking-constituted sufficient protection against the reoccur-
rence of predivestiture abuses which had led to the original antitrust suit in
1972.224 The FCC, filing as amicus curiae in support of the-DOJ Report,
observed that restricting the BOC's entry into the electronic publishing busi-
ness actually diminished the public interest. 225 The FCC asserted that less
information results from the information restriction.226
The DOJ based its recommendation on an extensive study conducted by
Dr. Peter Huber. 227 The Huber Report found that since the AT&T divesti-
electronic publishing industry is the source of this threat to the First Amendment
principle of diversity.
Id. at 184-85. The district court failed to take into account the uniqueness of the medium in
facilely adopting the first amendment jurisprudence developed around broadcasting. Id. at
183-85; see supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
220. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 225. See generally United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F.
Supp. 525, 529 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 87-5388 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. Nov.
30, 1987) (several of the approximately 300 briefs received covering every aspect of the MFJ
raised first amendment concerns).
221. DOJ Report, supra note 9; see Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 528 n. 1.
222. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 528; DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 56-57, 104, 121-23,
131-32.
223. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Computer
Inquiry III), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986), modified, 2 FCC Rcd 3035 (1987). Computer Inquiry
III established safeguards against BOC monopolization by requiring implementation of "Com-
parably Efficient Interconnection" (CEI) and "Open Network Architecture" (ONA). See id.
at 3039, 3042-43. For a complete analysis of the purpose and affect of the Computer Inquiry
and Joint Costs decisions, see DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 26-34, 104, 131-33, 137-54.
224. DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 104.
225. Comments of the Federal Communications Commission as Amicus Curiae on the Re-
port and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line of Business Restrictions
Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification of Final Judgment at 7, United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987) (No. 82-0192) [hereinafter FCC
Brief].
226. Id.
227. DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 38-39. A document entitled, The Geodesic Network:
1987 Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry prepared by Dr. Peter Huber, a DOJ




ture the structure of the communications industry had evolved from a hier-
archical "pyramid '  toward a dispersed homogeneous "geodesic"
network.2 29 In the geodesic network, control rests with the individual net-
work users in an array of small switching systems.2 30 The geodesic network
limits the ability of any one organization to exercise monopolistic control
over competitors.231 Thus, the telecommunications industry is becoming de-
centralized and more competitive, warranting removal of the line of business
restrictions. Moreover, the Huber Report found it impossible for an individ-
ual BOC to impede competition in the information services industry which
operated on a national and international scale.232
On September 10, 1987 the district court upheld the content restriction
imposed in the 1982 consent decree. 233 The court rejected the DOJ's asser-
tion that sufficient competition existed to warrant removal of the informa-
tion restrictions. 23 The court based its conclusion on a competitive analysis
of the local market in which the BOC's controlled the transmission net-
work-rather than the national market identified in the Huber Report-find-
ing that information service providers remained regionally dependent on the
BOC's local exchange facilities.235 In addition, the court rejected DOJ rec-
ommendations to transfer oversight of the MFJ to the FCC.236 The court
228. The pyramid theory details a centralized concentration of network control functions,
such as the large central office switch, dominated by a single company. Thus, the incentive to
monopolize what constitutes a bottle-neck facility requires government regulation and/or ex-
clusion of that entity from competing in the market. DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 40-42, 44.
229. Information services, provided under the geodesic model, move through a variety of
terminal devices connected to the network infrastructure at decentralized switching points
under user control. These user-owned sub-networks, operating at the outer edges of the basic
network, provide the necessary check on the BOC's power to control prices and exclude com-
petition. Thus, there exists little need to exclude the BOC's from the market. Under the
geodesic model proper regulatory oversight should be directed towards implementing struc-
tural regulations like Computer Inquiry III. Id. at 40-43, 126-28; see supra note 223.
230. DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 41.
231. Id. at 42-43.
232. Huber Report, supra note 227, at 6.51. The Huber Report found that thousands of
national databases exist including information service competition from sectors such as
Reuters, Dow Jones, McGraw-Hill, Dun & Bradstreet, Mead Data Central, Lockheed, Com-
puserve and foreign PTT's. Id. at 6.12 and 6.50-51; see also id. at Table IS.3 (Providers of
Information Content Used in Some Major U.S. Electronic Applications). Moreover, it identified
major joint ventures between IBM, Sears, and CBS; and, AT&T, Chemical Bank, Bank of
America, and, Time, Inc. Id. at 6.50.
233. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed,
No. 87-5388 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1987).
234. Id. at 539-40.
235. Id. at 586; DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 111-12 (discussing the changing nature of the
information services market).
236. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 531. Senator Dole introduced a bill proposing to rein-
vest regulatory authority over telephone communications with the FCC. S. 2565, 99th Cong.,
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criticized FCC regulations as ineffective in preventing anticompetitive
abuses in the past or the foreseeable future.237
On March 7, 1988 in United States v. Western Elec. Co., 238 Judge Greene
permitted the BOC's to offer certain limited services for use by the informa-
tion service industry, but retained the core prohibition preventing the BOC's
from providing information it owned or controlled. 239 The court rejected
arguments that the domestic information market needed the BOC's in light
of foreign competition.24 The court perceived no advantage to the domestic
information industry in lifting the content restrictions from the BOC's.24 1 It
2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S7750-52 (1986). However, the Dole bill died in committee when
the 99th Congress adjourned. The 100th Congress endorsed easing the information services
restrictions placed on the BOC's by the MFJ. H.R. Con. Res. 339, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134
CONG. REC. E2412-13 (1988). Key House members supported the resolution designed to
gauge congressional interest for future legislation similar to that sponsored by Senator Dole.
Dingell Joins Bipartisan Group in Endorsing Free-RHC Effort, Communications Daily, July 15,
1988, at 4-5. The resolution suggests removing the line of business restrictions (which include
information services) to promote development of a "state-of-the-art public telecommunications
network" and our "national policy by enhancing the capacity of the United States to better
compete in the global information and high technology marketplace ...." H.R. Con. Res.
339, at 2, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. E2412-13 (1988). The Senate introduced a
similar resolution, S. Con. Res. 161, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S16,152-53
(1988), designed to begin congressional involvement in removing the line of business restric-
tions placed on the RHC's by the MFJ. Free-RHC Resolution Offered in Senate, Communica-
tions Daily, Oct. 17, 1988, at 1-2. On April 27, 1989, House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance members Al Swift (D-Wash.) and Thomas J. Tauke (R-IA)
sponsored legislation that would permit the RHC's and BOC's to, among other things, enter
the information services market. H.R. 2140, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 Cong. Rec. H1454
(daily ed. Apr. 27, 1989). The bill vests authority over information services with the FCC. See
135 Cong. Rec. E1414 (extension of remarks of Rep. Tauke), E1417-18 (extension of remarks
of Rep. Slattery, D-Kans.) (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1989).
237. See Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 531-32. The Commission argued that it
ha[d] developed regulatory mechanisms more precisely tailored to the new market-
place conditions that should permit the Court to conclude that there is no substantial
possibility that a BOC could use any market power it may possess to impede compe-
tition. Through several extensive proceedings, this Commission has developed safe-
guards that will ensure fair, unimpeded competition if the RBOC's [Regional Bell
Operating Companies] are relieved of the decree's absolute entry restrictions.
FCC Brief, supra note 225, at 9-10 (footnote omitted).
238. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,918, 57,620
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1988).
239. Id. The district court allowed the BOC's to provide a "help" function and directions
regarding how to locate and select information service providers; "White Pages" electronic
directories to the extent it includes a listing of telephone subscribers with addresses and tele-
phone numbers, electronic mail, and voice storage and retrieval services. See Western Elec.,
673 F. Supp. at 594-96; see also DOJ Report, supra note 9, at 114-15, 121 (comparing lost
efficiencies in the American information services markets due to MFJ restrictions with those of
foreign countries).




concluded that the BOC's lacked the necessary experience in generating in-
formation and therefore were "not needed in these aspects of American busi-
ness." '242 "The production of and changes in the form of information are the
province of hundreds of professions, occupations, and trades .... Those in-
volved in these businesses possess the necessary expertise; the Regional
Companies do not." '243 Appeal is pending before the D. C. Circuit.2
VI. SUBSTITUTING COMPETITIVE SCARCITY FOR SPECTRUM SCARCITY
In the MFJ decision and the subsequent triennial review, the district court
found that the BOC's, as common carriers, are subject to a different first
amendment standard than that applied to traditional publishers.24 How-
ever, the district court failed to recognize that a single entity can be a com-
mon carrier in one instance and not in another.246 Thus, in those services not
offered on a common carrier basis, the BOC's should enjoy the same first
amendment protections as other corporations and natural persons.247
In the interest of promoting diversity, the district court relied on the the-
ory behind broadcast regulation, in which the Supreme Court permits con-
tent regulation of broadcasting if the government asserts a substantial
government interest in regulating.24 The district court asserted a twofold
governmental interest. First, to further the national policy embodied in the
antitrust laws, the court sought to remedy AT&T's past anticompetitive con-
duct by ordering divestiture of the BOC's.2 49 Second, the court intended to
promote the first amendment interest in diversity by preventing concentra-
tion of ownership and control in the information services industry from
242. Id. at 57,621.
243. Id. at 57,620-21.
244. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No.
87-5388 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1987).
245. Id. at 586 n.273.
246. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.9 (1979); see also National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[S]ince it is
clearly possible for a given entity to carry on many types of activities, it is at least logical to
conclude that one can be a common carrier with regard to some activities but not others.");
First Report and Order, Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems; and Inquiry into the Devel-
opment of Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Regulatory Policy and
Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 207 (1967).
247. The Supreme Court in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978),
found corporate speech entitled to full first amendment protection. Id. at 783. In determining
the level of first amendment protection, the Court refused to distinguish between individuals as
speakers and corporations. Id. at 777.
248. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 585 n.270.
249. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 184-85 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586-87.
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emerging in the newly divested BOC's. 250 Thus, to promote diversity, the
district court found it necessary to burden the BOC's first amendment right
of free speech by approving the MFJ which banned their participation in the
information services industry. Absent the BOC's, the court speculated, com-
petition would flourish. 251 To satisfy the first amendment's bar to govern-
ment restrictions on speech, the court equated the broadcast rationale of
spectrum scarcity with what this Comment refers to as a competitive scar-
city theory and imposed a complete ban on the divested BOC's rights to
speak and publish over their own facilities.252
The district court used the federal antitrust laws to prevent the newly
divested BOC's from entering the information services market.25 3 Antitrust
laws serve a legitimate governmental interest 25 4 and courts must fashion
remedies that in some instances implicate first amendment rights of speak-
ers.255 The antitrust laws generally place structural barriers on the anticom-
petitive practice at issue in a particular case. 256 If the practice implicates
speech, the court must structure the remedy narrowly to serve both the in-
250. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 185; Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586-87.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 214-19.
252. Id.
253. AT&T 552 F. Supp. at 185.
254. See generally United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-76 (1966). The
Sherman Antitrust Act serves to thwart the "evils which flow from monopoly-that is the
concentration of economic power in the hands of a few. On the basis of this fear, Congress in
1890 ... passed the Sherman Act." Id. at 274. The courts take an active role to ensure the
policies of the Sherman Act, which protect "worthy men," namely the small business person
from large concentrated industries, are enforced. Id. As the Supreme Court observed, "[t]he
heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition." Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
255. The principal antitrust case, National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), on which the district court relied to support its decision to approve
the MFJ's content prohibition, involved a professional society's canon of ethics prohibiting
competitive bidding for engineering services. Id. at 683. The standard applied by the Supreme
Court to test the lower court decision in Professional Engineers, asked the question "whether
the relief represents a reasonable method of eliminating the consequences of the illegal con-
duct." Id. at 698. The Court found the remedy reasonable even though it restricted some
speech. Id. However, the remedy fashioned by the lower court in Professional Engineers did
not include a total ban on all speech. Id. at 698 n.27. The case does not answer the question of
whether the Court would find a total ban on the Society's speech "reasonable." Thus, the
Supreme Court's affirmance of Professional Engineers does not support the absolute ban on
BOC's speech imposed by the MFJ and approved by the district court. See supra note 3.
Nor is a complete ban on speech at issue in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945), another antitrust case relied on by the district court in the MFJ decision. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Associated Press struck down a private agreement limiting AP news to mem-
bers only and prohibiting members from dispersing news to non-members. Id. at 20.
256. See supra note 254. See generally International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947). The federal antitrust laws "effectively pry open to competition a market that has been
closed by defendants' illegal restraints." Id. at 401.
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terests of the antitrust laws and those of the first amendment.257 However, a
"narrowly drawn" remedy represents one in which the illegal conduct can
"reasonably" be eliminated by fashioning appropriate restraints on future
activities.258 Placing a total ban on the BOC's ability to engage in speech to
prevent the anticipated future violation of the federal antitrust laws, and to
promote the speech of potential competitors in the information industry, vio-
lates the Supreme Court's holding in first amendment cases259 and therefore,
cannot be accepted as reasonable. Moreover, in no case does the Supreme
Court permit a complete ban on the communication of one speaker in order
to promote diversity." °
The fact that the BOC's control a portion of the transmission paths that
competitors use to deliver information cannot justify deprivation of the
BOC's first amendment right to use their own facilities.26' The possible scar-
city of electronic publishers fails to rise to the substantial interest required in
spectrum scarcity cases262 and therefore cannot justify preventing a willing
speaker from publishing. While the courts may fashion antitrust remedies to
structurally curtail anticompetitive activities, they must balance competing
first amendment interests.263 The district court, in barring the BOC's from
speaking, fails to adequately account for both interests.
Content-based restrictions designed to promote information diversity by
eliminating competitive scarcity necessarily require a government actor to
257. As a general proposition, the Supreme Court has not acknowledged any inconsistency
or tension between the first amendment and the antitrust laws. See Associated Press, 326 U.S.
at 19-20; Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155-56 (1951). However, first
amendment considerations do influence how antitrust laws are applied in a case. See
Homefinders of Am., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 621 F.2d 441, 444 (lst Cir. 1980);
Levitch v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 660-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983).
258. Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 697-98.
259. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("[T]he concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed 'to secure the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' ") (quoting New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)); see also Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-
91 (1978).
260. An antitrust remedy should affect "as little injury as possible to the interest of the
general public" and parties involved. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,
185 (1911). "When choosing between effective remedies, a court should impose the relief
which impinges least upon other public policies." United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,
150-51 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
261. See sources cited supra notes 246-47.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 96-108.
263. See supra notes 255, 257 and accompanying text.
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choose many speakers over one speaker.264 Under a competition theory, the
most efficient or effective voice in the market necessarily requires suppres-
sion. Suppressing speech because it is efficient or effective undermines the
first amendment. 265 Directly regulating content because of the effectiveness
of the medium or indirectly regulating content to promote favored classes of
speakers creates a heavy presumption of invalidity.
2 66
Further, the district court failed to consider the possible prior restraint
implications of the MFJ excluding the BOC's from speaking over their own
transmission facilities.267 The MFJ's information restriction prevents the
BOC's from transmitting their own information over the telephone network
and denies material to that segment of the public wanting information.268
264. In both AT&T and the triennial review the district court maintained the MFJ's prohi-
bition preventing the BOC's from speaking in order to enhance the opportunity for other elec-
tronic publishers.
Control by one entity of both the content of information and the means for its trans-
mission raises an obvious problem and, in fact, the Court concluded in 1982 that
AT&T's control of a large part of the interexchange network would enable it to dis-
advantage and to discriminate against rival electronic information providers and thus
to pose a substantial threat to the First Amendment diversity principle.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 87-
5388 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1987); see also A T&T, 552 F. Supp. at 184-85.
However, promoting one speaker at the expense of another violates the first amendment. See
supra note 259.
265. See supra text accompanying note 156-57.
266. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 47-48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977).
267. The existence of the waiver process does not change the nature of the restraint. The
BOC's still must seek prior clearance before speaking. "Under the decree itself, [the informa-
tion] restriction may be removed only if the Regional Companies are able to make a certain
showing, again mandated by the decree, one that they have not made and could not make at
this time." Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586 n.273.
268. The first amendment's proscription against abridging freedom of speech correlatively
protects the rights of persons to receive ideas and information. "It is now well established that
the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas." Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)); see Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("this freedom embraces the right to distribute
literature ... and necessarily protects the right to receive it."); see also Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (finding the addressee's unfettered right to receive the mails
paramount to asserted governmental interest); Thomas v. Colins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945)
(sustaining Texas worker's right to meet, discuss and be informed of impending election for
collective bargaining agent). "This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their
social worth, see [Winters v. New York,] 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), is fundamental to our free
society." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
The Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), extended
the right to receive information to include listeners and viewers. "It is the right of the public
to receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences
which is crucial here. That right may not be constitutionally abridged either by Congress or
by the FCC." Id. at 390.
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First Amendment Assumptions
Prior restraint on a potential speaker bears the heaviest presumption of
invalidity.2 69
Moreover, even as a content-neutral regulation meant to effect a barrier to
future anticompetitive activities, the court's decision must fail. To promote
diversity, the court found it necessary to burden the BOC's protected free-
dom to speak by prohibiting their participation in the information services
industry.27 ° Absent the BOC's, the court speculated that competition would
flourish.2 7 ' Thus, the court identified competition that leads to viewpoint
diversity as the important or substantial governmental interest.272
In a content-neutral analysis, however, the regulatory restriction must
only incidentally burden protected speech and reach no further then neces-
sary or "essential" to further the purported interest.273 The Supreme Court
has never permitted the elimination of speech in the interest of diversity.
274
Unlike a regulation enforcing order in the broadcast spectrum, where absent
government involvement the message transmitted becomes an impossibil-
ity, 275 the MFJ prohibition prevents the BOC's from transmitting their own
information over the telephone network.2 76 The content-neutral standard re-
quires the MFJ prohibition to be closely tailored to the end served, so that
the information which the BOC's would generate absent the restriction
reaches the intended audience.277 Otherwise, the information restriction cur-
tails the flow of information and imposes unnecessary restrictions on the first
amendment rights of the BOC's, and, as a consequence, diversity suffers.
Even in the broadcast context where spectrum scarcity remains a legitimate
end, regulations fail when they limit rather than enhance diversity.2 78
269. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) ("The question is whether ... re-
straint of publication is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press . . . . In
determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally,
considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon
publication.").
270. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 184-85 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nor.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 585-86.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 214-17.
272. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586.
273. See infra note 277.
274. See sources cited supra note 259.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 67-79.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 196-203.
277. The Supreme Court articulated the appropriate content-neutral test as:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
278. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Freedom of expression protected by the first amendment facilitates public
discussion. Diversity represents the underlying first amendment value that
truth will ultimately prevail in a marketplace of ideas when there are a mul-
titude of information sources. However, regulating information flow to ad-
vance diversity frustrates the first amendment values it attempts to promote.
Rather than protecting the free flow of ideas, government regulation to en-
hance diversity burdens speech. Moreover, such governmental involvement
falls outside permissible boundaries of legitimate regulation, even in a mar-
ketplace limited by scarce resources.
The express language of the first amendment barring government involve-
ment in speech represents an implicit understanding that measures taken to
promote diversity are permissible only when they encourage a multiplicity of
outlets. Measures taken to force a limited number of media outlets to repre-
sent viewpoint diversity immediately call for confrontation with the first
amendment. Moreover, as illustrated in the district court's MFJ decision,
limiting the number of media outlets by preventing potential publishers from
entering the information market in order to sustain existing outlets repre-
sents an illegitimate expansion of government powers to regulate the content
of speech.
Richard A. Hindman
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